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OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S NON-DEFENSE OF DOMA  
AND EXECUTIVE DUTY TO REPRESENT 
KATHLEEN TIPLER∗ 
In February 2011, the Obama Administration announced it believed 
the Defense of Marriage Act1 (“DOMA”) was unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds.2  The Department of Justice would no longer defend 
DOMA in court, wrote Attorney General Eric H. Holder, but the Obama 
Administration would nonetheless continue to enforce it.3  The decision to 
enforce but not defend—while not wholly unprecedented4—is a peculiar 
one: the decision to not defend is based on an executive judgment that the 
statute is unconstitutional, and if a statute is unconstitutional, then an obvi-
ous implication is that the statute should not be enforced. 
Why did the Obama Administration engage in this particular and pecu-
liar parsing?  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) argued this path both re-
spects the Executive’s constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws 
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  1.  Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)). 
 2.  See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Hon. John H. 
Boehner, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter At-
torney General Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html 
(“After careful consideration . . . the President of the United States has made the determination 
that . . . the Defense of Marriage Act . . . violates the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
 3.  See id. (“[T]he President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute . . . 
[n]owithstanding this determination, the President has informed that Section 3 will continue to be 
enforced by the Executive Branch.”). 
 4.  See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (up-
holding the government’s obligation to pay defendants for services rendered but avoiding adopt-
ing the interpretation of the statute at issue because “grave constitutional doubts will arise”); INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (noting that “[t]he President’s participation in the legislative 
process [] to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from 
improvident laws” was intentionally designed as part of a bicameral system of government). 
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be Faithfully executed,”5 as well as the Executive’s obligation to the Con-
stitution.6  In not defending the statute, the executive branch demonstrates 
its belief that no “reasonable” defense of the statute’s constitutionality ex-
ists.7  In enforcing the statute until congressional repeal or a “definitive 
verdict” by the judiciary, the Executive “respects the actions of the prior 
Congress” and “recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitu-
tional claims raised.”8 
Debates over the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not 
defend DOMA (and debates over executive non-defense and enforcement 
more generally) tend to balance these two competing executive duties: the 
duty to execute laws passed by Congress, and the duty to interpret and up-
hold the Constitution.9  Yet even the most sympathetic supporters of the 
Obama Administration can find this argument hard to swallow.10  It is diffi-
cult to understand the decision to not defend but enforce as driven by prin-
cipled, legal reasons.  There is too much complicated, back-bending parsing 
of what would seem to be an obvious choice (either enforce and defend, or 
do neither);11 too little precedent, in both quantity and type;12 and too many 
standing and jurisdictional questions.13 
                                                          
 5.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. 
 6.  Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008) (arguing “the Constitution actually requires the President to disre-
gard unconstitutional statutes”). 
 7.  See Attorney General Letter, supra note 2 (stating that “[t]his is the rare case where the 
proper course is to forgo the defense of [DOMA]” despite its “longstanding practice of defending 
the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their de-
fense”). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 507, 509–10 (2012) (rejecting the positions of both critics and advocates for the Obama 
Administration’s policy on DOMA and instead suggesting that “the duties to enforce and defend 
are inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and structure, both of which speak to the President’s 
responsibility to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution as he understands it”). 
 10.  See Halimah Abdullah, Optimistic Obama Touts Movement on Gay Rights, but Frustra-
tions Remain, CNNPOLITICS.COM (June 14, 2013, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/politics/obama-lgbt (recognizing that “frustrations among some 
gays and lesbians who have been steadfast Obama supporters but had hoped for even more action 
during his first five years in office”). 
 11.  See Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 509 (arguing that either position is misplaced and 
misunderstood by both Obama’s critics and supporters). 
 12.  See infra Part I. 
 13.  Matthew I. Hall, How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG 
Cannot), 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 92, 95 (2013), available at 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/congress-defend-doma (arguing that only the Department of 
Justice has the right to assert the legal interest of the United States). 
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While the legal rationale is not obvious, the political rationale is.  The 
Obama Administration’s decision makes sense as a response to the interests 
of its political base and party, as well as the growing number of Americans 
who believe in same-sex marriage.14 (If one is not so sympathetic, pander-
ing might be substituted here for “response.”)  Not insignificantly, the 
Obama Administration’s decision is also one that avoids a potentially high-
cost, out-and-out constitutional confrontation with Congress or the judici-
ary.15  The decision to enforce but not defend could be reasonably interpret-
ed as a politically beneficial “executive deferral” to the Court (in an adapta-
tion of Mark Graber’s notion of a “legislative deferral”)16 or an act of 
symbolic “position-taking.”17  Conservative commentators have said as 
much, anticipating or echoing Chief Justice John Roberts’s remarks that 
President Obama failed to display “the courage of his convictions.”18  
Whether one is sympathetic to Chief Justice Roberts or President Obama, it 
is clear that what is a highly peculiar course of action from a legal perspec-
tive is not peculiar at all from a political perspective. 
In this Essay, I argue that debates over the constitutionality of the 
Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend DOMA should 
take into account not only the duties to execute the law and uphold the Con-
stitution but also a duty of democratic representation.  Applying this duty of 
democratic representation enables the evaluation of behavior that might 
otherwise be simply dismissed as “political.”  All too often, constitutional 
analysis ignores the so-called “political” aspects of decisions, believing 
those aspects to be beyond constitutional judgment.19  But dismissing par-
                                                          
 14.  See, e.g., Allison Kopicki, Polls Show Consistent Gains in Support for Same-Sex Mar-
riage,  N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/03/26/polls-show-consistent-gains-in-support-for-same-sex-marriage (reporting that the per-
cent of Americans in support of legalizing same-sex marriage rose from forty-six percent last July 
to fifty-three percent). 
 15.  See Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 511 (explaining “the modern duties to enforce 
and defend” persist because they “curry good will with Congress and the courts”). 
 16.  Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).  See also GEORGE LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: 
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (2003) (observing 
“there are instances where the opportunity for judges to influence policy arises because legislators 
deliberately avoid making choices about policies and instead allow judges to make those choic-
es”). 
 17.  KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 140 
(2007). 
 18.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(No. 12-307), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-307_jnt1.pdf. 
 19.  See Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 549 (noting that “[t]he separation of powers ex-
ception to the duty to enforce . . . facilitates the OLC’s [Office of Legal Counsel] reputation as 
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ticular actions as “political” suggests certain behavior is somehow beyond 
principled analysis and constitutionally grounded judgments. 
I argue that both the electoral character of the executive office as out-
lined in Article II, as well as the Take Care Clause, generate a constitutional 
duty of democratic representation.  I give specific content to this duty by 
examining the principles entailed in the concept of representation.  I review 
four models of democratic representation: 1) “promissory,” 2) “anticipa-
tory,” 3) “gyroscopic,” and 4) “surrogate.”20  These models describe empir-
ical constraints on representative behavior (such as the pressure of elec-
tions) and normative standards for evaluating democratic representative 
behavior and representative institutions.21  I apply these models of represen-
tation to debates over the Obama Administration’s non-defense of DOMA, 
showing how a duty of democratic representation alters the terms of the de-
bate and enables the constitutional evaluation of actions that otherwise ap-
pear unprincipled and purely “political.”  In the case of the Obama Admin-
istration’s decision to enforce but not defend DOMA, applying a duty of 
democratic representation increases concerns regarding standing.22  It also 
suggests that fears of expansive executive power should be refocused on 
fostering the “systemic” aspects of democracy, such as interbranch dialogue 
and the quality of mass deliberation.23 
This Essay proceeds in six parts.  First, I provide some brief back-
ground on DOMA and the administration’s position.24  Next, I outline de-
bates over the constitutionality of the administration’s position.25  These 
debates balance competing executive duties to, on one hand, enforce and 
defend congressional statutes; and, on the other, offer an independent con-
stitutional vision.  The terms of this debate do not leave room to explain, 
and therefore evaluate, the so-called “political” behavior in the Obama Ad-
ministration’s decision to enforce yet not defend DOMA. 
                                                          
being above politics,” thereby allowing them to “look[] to courts to settle the constitutionality of 
federal legislation”). 
 20.  Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 515 (2003). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See Hall, supra note 13, at 95, (emphasizing that “[t]he United States certainly possesses 
an interest in defending any challenged federal law, but the authority to assert the interests of the 
United States in Court is granted by statute to the Department of Justice, and not to the BLAG or 
to Congress”). 
 23.  See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who 
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 109 
(2004) (proposing a cooperative form of interbranch constitutional interpretation in which each 
branch recognizes the strengths of the others). 
 24.  See infra Part I. 
 25.  See infra Part II. 
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In the third part of this Essay, I argue an executive duty of democratic 
representation is entailed in the Constitution.26  A duty to represent may 
prompt fears of undisciplined interpretations of the Constitution and expan-
sive executive power.  I argue that many of these fears are unwarranted, the 
product of a problematic understanding of democratic representation.  Us-
ing models of democratic representation developed in political science, I 
show how we might understand the duty to represent as a disciplined one.27  
In other words, democratic representation entails specific constraints and 
obligations.  Because of the constraints and obligations entailed in the con-
cept of representation, I suggest that explicitly balancing a duty to represent 
with other constitutional duties should not unduly increase worries over ex-
ecutive power.  In the penultimate section of this Essay, I show how apply-
ing this duty to the debates over the Obama Administration’s decision to 
enforce but not defend DOMA changes the terms of the debate, highlight-
ing new dimensions that have been overlooked.28 
Deriving a duty of democratic representation from the Constitution is a 
reasonable interpretation of what the Constitution requires.  Legal experts 
regularly appeal to extra-constitutional resources to fill in these contours.  
The same can be done with the executive duty of democratic representation.  
“Political” need not translate to “beyond principled constitutional judg-
ment.” 
I.  DOMA AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DECISION TO ENFORCE 
BUT NOT DEFEND 
In 1996, the Supreme Court of Hawaii opined that prohibiting same-
sex marriages might violate the state constitution’s equal protection 
clause.29  The Hawaii Supreme Court returned the case to a lower court.30  
During that time, voters passed an initiative amending the Hawaii constitu-
tion, rendering the equal protection question moot.31 
                                                          
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  See infra Part IV. 
 28.  See infra Part V. 
 29.  See Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112, 116 (Haw. 1996), remanded to 1996 WL 694235 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (“If Hawaii permits same-sex 
marriages, and the Applicants’ religious beliefs forbade them from solemnizing marriages of 
same-sex couples, then the state could not require them to do so.  Such a requirement would create 
excessive entanglement between government and religion, resulting in a violation of the free exer-
cise clause.”).  
 30.  Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 
(Haw. 1997). 
 31.  See Mark Niesse, Hawaii Legislature Approves Same-Sex Civil Unions, NBCNEWS.COM 
(Feb. 16, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41630515/ns/us_news-life/t/hawaii-
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While Hawaii did not legalize same-sex marriage, the initial court de-
cision prompted the passage of DOMA.  Members of Congress argued if 
Hawaii or another state legalized same-sex marriage, other states would be 
forced to recognize these marriages under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.32  Section 2 of DOMA thus provided that states need not recognize 
same-sex marriages from other states, and Section 3 defined marriage as 
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”33  Although members of Congress focused their argu-
ments on state recognition, Section 3 of DOMA has had great influence on 
federal law in such areas as employee benefits, immigration, and taxes.34 
In the past few years, the constitutionality of Section 3 was repeatedly 
challenged, with a growing number of federal courts finding Section 3’s 
application to be in violation of equal protection (with some courts applying 
rational basis review, and others, heightened scrutiny).35  In December of 
2012, the Supreme Court agreed to review Section 3 in United States v. 
Windsor,36 and in June 2013, the Court found Section 3 unconstitutional.37 
                                                          
legislature-approves-same-sex-civil-unions/#.Uh2uPn-gY4k (reporting that the Hawaii Legisla-
ture’s “approval marked an end to . . . the gay rights movement since [Baehr v. Lewin]”). 
 32.  See Joseph W. Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of 
Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 4 (2005) (“In the multi-state context, the focus is on the 
claim that couples whose marriages are valid where celebrated have a right to have their marriages 
respected in other jurisdictions, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.”). 
 33.  Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 34.  For a discussion of executive discretion in the distribution of Federal benefits under 
DOMA, see Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Fed-
eral Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 621 (2012) (“[S]ection 3 of DOMA prevents thousands of 
couples with valid marriages from receiving any of the more than 1,000 privileges the federal 
government provides married couples under tax, pension, Medicare, and Social Security benefit 
programs.”). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
DOMA is not “substantially related to an important government interest” and is thereby unconsti-
tutional), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health and Hu-
man Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that “Congress’ denial of federal benefits to 
same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts has not been adequately supported by any 
permissible federal interest”); Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that “[t]he federal government, by enacting 
and enforcing DOMA, plainly encroaches upon the firmly entrenched province of the state, 
and . . . offends the Tenth Amendment”), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Pedersen v. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 343 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding that “a ‘concern for the public 
fisc’ affords no rational basis for Section 3 of DOMA”); Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[T]he Court does not find that the third proffered reason for 
the passage of DOMA—to defend traditional notions of morality—provides a justification that is 
substantially related to an important governmental objective.”). 
 36.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Throughout most of the litigation leading up to Windsor, however, the 
Obama Administration defended the statute’s constitutionality.  But on Feb-
ruary 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder notified Congress that the DOJ 
would no longer defend DOMA.38  In prior cases in which the DOJ had de-
fended DOMA, some circuit courts established that sexual orientation was 
subject to rational basis review.39  In two district court cases that involved 
the DOJ and were not yet decided, Windsor v. United States40 and Pedersen 
v. Office of Personnel Management,41 the circuit courts had not yet estab-
lished the level of review.42  Attorney General Holder claimed “the Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifi-
cations based on sexual orientation.”43  Using the criteria the Court had 
previously set forth, the Attorney General explained, “Each . . . factor[] 
counsels in favor of being suspicious of classifications based on sexual ori-
entation.”44  Attorney General Holder thus argued “classifications based on 
sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-
sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is uncon-
stitutional.”45 
Attorney General Holder also explained the Executive would continue 
to enforce and comply with Section 3, “unless and until Congress repeals 
Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s 
constitutionality.”46  Warding off criticisms that the Executive saw itself as 
equal to the Judiciary or superior to Congress, Attorney General Holder 
wrote: “This course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that 
enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the 
constitutional claims raised.”47  After this clear declaration of the judiciary 
as “final arbiter,” Attorney General Holder reaffirmed judicial supremacy, 
stating that: 
 If asked by the district courts in the Second Circuit for the posi-
tion of the United States in the event those courts determine that 
                                                          
 37.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“DOMA seeks to injure the very 
class New York seeks to protect.  By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”). 
 38.  See Attorney General Letter, supra note 2. 
 39.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 40.  833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 41.  881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012). 
 42.  See Attorney General Letter, supra note 2.  
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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the applicable standard is rational basis, the Department will state 
that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases, a rea-
sonable argument for Section 3’s constitutionality may be prof-
fered under that permissive standard.48 
With House Speaker John Boehner’s advocacy, the House’s Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) met shortly after Holder released the 
DOJ memo and decided in a 3-2 vote (along partisan lines) to hire legal 
counsel.49  That summer, the DOJ filed briefs arguing the unconstitutionali-
ty of DOMA.50 
II.  COMPETING EXECUTIVE DUTIES AND THE “POLITICS” OF NON-DEFENSE 
The Obama Administration’s decision to continue to enforce but not 
defend DOMA was met with criticisms from many sides.  Orin Kerr saw it 
as an “executive power grab,” setting a dangerous precedent for the exercise 
of executive discretion in choosing which laws to defend and which to not 
defend—all at “the expense of Congress’s power.”51  While progressives 
might have liked President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA, the 
Administration’s decision to apply “a contested constitutional theory within 
the Executive branch,” was, Kerr warned, like John Yoo’s use of Article II: 
“a power grab disguised as academic constitutional interpretation.”52 
                                                          
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Felicia Sonmez, House to Defend the Defense of Marriage Act in Court, Washing-
tonpost.com (Mar. 9, 2011, 7:26 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/2chambers/ 
2011/03/house_to_defend_the_defense_of.html (the Republican majority being Boehner, House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy; and the dissenting Democrats be-
ing Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer).  The BLAG defense of 
DOMA was led by former Solicitor General Paul Clement.  See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Law Firm 
Backs out of Defending Marriage Act, N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:45 PM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/law-firm-backs-out-of-defending-marriage-act-
partner-resigns.  The firm that was initially hired, King & Spalding, withdrew under pressure.  Id.  
Clement resigned and continued as BLAG’s attorney.  See id. (reporting that the law firm’s deci-
sion to withdraw “amid pressure from gay rights groups” prompted Clement to resign out of loyal-
ty to his client, BLAG).   
 50.  E.g., Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss, Golinski v. United States 
Office of Pers. Mgmt, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-00257-JSW), available 
at http://equalityontrial.com//wp-content/uploads/2011/07/DOJ-OppToBLAGMtD.pdf; Defendant 
United States’ Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (No.1:10-cv-08435-BSJ-JCF), available at http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/WindsorVUS-
USResponse.pdf. 
 51.  Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-
executive-power-grab-in-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma/. 
 52.  Id. 
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This apparent expansion of executive discretion seemed particularly 
alarming because the DOJ’s rationale for non-defense has traditionally re-
quired that either a statute infringe on executive authority or that no “rea-
sonable” defense exists.53  With DOMA, there was no obvious infringement 
of executive authority,54 and the fact that the DOJ had been defending 
DOMA prior to February 2011 seemed clear evidence that a reasonable ar-
gument remained available.  Furthermore, previous arguments put forward 
by the academy and former members of the DOJ to justify non-defense do 
not seem to hold in this case.  If the Executive had vetoed a statute on con-
stitutional grounds, or even voiced constitutional concerns, the Executive 
might have sensibly declined to defend.  For example, when former Presi-
dent Bill Clinton declined to defend a 1996 statute banning HIV-positive 
members from the military, not only did he voice constitutional concerns 
during the legislative process, but his defenders also argued the Executive 
had a particular institutional capacity or expertise as Commander in Chief 
to do so.55 
In the case of DOMA, however, the traditional DOJ rationales do not 
hold.56  Then-President Clinton signed the original (DOMA) legislation and 
did not voice strong constitutional concerns as he had with the HIV-positive 
ban.57  Nor is same-sex marriage an issue that clearly involves executive 
                                                          
 53.  See Marty Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal Statutes in 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, BALKINIZATION (Sep. 8, 2005, 12:11 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/john-roberts-and-sgs-refusal-to-defend.html (“As a general 
matter, the Department has traditionally adhered to a policy of defending the constitutionality of 
federal enactments whenever ‘reasonable’ arguments can be made in support of such stat-
utes . . . .”); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objec-
tionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 49 (“The Department 
of Justice routinely defends statutes that are unconstitutional under the President’s view, as well as 
under the best understanding of applicable judicial precedent, as long as a reasonable argument 
can be made in their defense.”). 
 54.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1183, 1231 (2012) (declaring that Obama’s decision to enforce but not defend was not granted by 
an infringement of executive powers). 
 55.  See Johnsen, supra note 53, at 56–57 (recognizing the “considerable expertise” President 
Clinton brought “to the issue in his role as commander in chief”).  Such an argument is also con-
tained in then Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois’s letter to Congress explaining the deci-
sion, citing “the needs and purposes of the armed services.”  Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant 
Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary (Mar. 22, 1996). 
 56.  See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 54, at 1231–32 (highlighting several differences from the 
typical situation in which the executive might refuse to enforce or defend an act of Congress, in-
cluding: precedence, failure to seek Supreme Court review, statutory implementation, etc.). 
 57.  See Chris Geidner, Becoming Law, METROWEEKLY.COM (Sep. 29, 2011, 3:42 AM), 
http://metroweekly.com/feature/?ak=6613 (detailing the history of DOMA including excerpts of 
President Clinton’s statement). 
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capacity and power, unlike military readiness.58  That said, Dawn E. John-
sen claims that the equal protection dimension of this issue requires execu-
tive participation, and on these grounds she defends the Administration’s 
decision to enforce but not defend.59  She argues the President should play 
an important role in advancing the “understanding of constitutional equali-
ty” considering the national representative character of the office, and that 
the Solicitor General has always played “a special role” in protecting civil 
rights.60  While both these arguments are compelling as new arguments for 
not defending a statute, it is not clear that either falls under the traditional 
DOJ rationales. 
Furthermore, the Administration’s decision not to defend risks prob-
lems with justiciability.  If a goal of executive non-defense is to generate a 
constitutional dialogue among the branches and the public, then the Execu-
tive should take care that its defense and enforcement decisions promote 
justiciability.61  If the Department of Justice did not defend DOMA, it is not 
clear who could have standing to take its place.  Although federal courts 
have so far recognized BLAG,62 the Supreme Court in Windsor raised the 
question of whether BLAG has standing, as well as whether the executive 
branch’s agreement that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives the Court of 
jurisdiction.63  The Court asked both BLAG and the DOJ to file briefs spe-
cifically on the jurisdictional question, and also appointed Harvard profes-
sor Vicki Jackson to argue the question as “friend of the court.”64  In short, 
the question of standing and justiciability is clearly a very real concern. 
                                                          
 58.  See Johnsen, supra note 53, at 56 (emphasizing that Clinton’s decision not to uphold the 
ban on HIV-members in the military “appropriately considered the likely effect of section 567 and 
concluded that discharging healthy, trained, and productive members of the military would be det-
rimental to military efficiency and effectiveness”). 
 59.  See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional 
Equality Rather Than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 618 (2012) (“Pres-
ident Obama properly and admirably has chosen to take part in this historic constitutional debate, 
thereby providing a valuable perspective while leaving the resolution of the dispute over DOMA’s 
constitutionality to the Supreme Court.”). 
 60.  Id. at 615. 
 61.  For a powerful defense and clear framework for evaluating executive nondefense and 
nonenforcement grounded in promoting constitutional dialogue and sensitive to institutional ca-
pacity, see Johnsen, supra note 53. 
 62.  See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Panetta, No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 27, 2011) (dealing 
with Title 38 of the Armed Forces, which excludes same-sex married couples from veterans’ ben-
efits); Dragovich v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (upholding plaintiffs’ equal protection claims despite “Federal Defendants” attempts to 
demonstrate a legitimate rationale for excluding long-term insurance for same-sex partners). 
 63.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
 64.  Id. 
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Others addressing the issue have argued that the Administration’s de-
cision to enforce but not defend was incoherent, unprincipled, and, even, 
cowardly.  Conservative commentators joined Chief Justice John Roberts in 
decrying President Obama’s failure to display “the courage of his convic-
tions.”65  Professors Devins and Prakash have argued claiming such a deci-
sion only serves the DOJ, solidifying its reputation to Congress and the ju-
diciary as politically independent and unbiased.66  They have advocated a 
strong departmentalist vision of constitutional interpretation, arguing that 
although the Constitution contains no duty to defend, the administration has 
a duty to follow and uphold its independent constitutional vision.67  Fur-
thermore, as Prakash has pointed out elsewhere, there appears to be inco-
herence in arguing for heightened scrutiny of DOMA while also publicly 
stating opposition to same-sex marriage being “federalized.”68  In an inter-
view on the ABC News, President Obama emphasized that he thought it 
was “a mistake to—try to make what has traditionally been a state issue into 
a national issue.”69  Given how equal protection standards might be applied 
to state as well as federal law, a successful argument for a heightened 
standard of review would seem to (eventually) invalidate state prohibitions 
on same-sex marriage.70 
While the above is not an exhaustive account of the current debate 
over the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend 
DOMA, it is illustrative in capturing the terms of debate.  On one hand, 
there is an executive duty to defend and enforce statutes passed by Con-
gress.71  On the other hand, there is an executive duty to interpret and up-
hold an independent constitutional vision.72  Although the boundaries of 
these duties are contested, the basic terms of this debate do not vary accord-
ing to the constitutional theory at work—advocates of both constitutional 
                                                          
 65.  See supra note 18 (highlighting Chief Justice Roberts’s statement: “And if [President 
Obama] has made a determination that executing the law by enforcing the terms is unconstitution-
al, I don’t see why he doesn’t have the courage of his convictions and execute not only the statute, 
but do it consistent with his view of the Constitution, rather than saying, oh, we’ll wait till the Su-
preme Court tells us we have no choice.”   
 66.  Devins & Prakash, supra note 9, at 510. 
 67.  Id. at 510–11. 
 68.  Saikrishana B. Prakash, Missing Links in the President’s Evolution on Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 554 (2012). 
 69.  12 Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview with President Obama, ABCNEWS 
(May 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview- with-
President-obama/story?id=16316043#.UEy_laPUSuk. 
 70.  See Prakash, supra note 68, at 555, 562–69 (discussing the “wholesale invalidation” of 
state laws governing marriage were DOMA to be subjected to the “heightened scrutiny” standard). 
 71.  U.S. CONST. art. II §3. 
 72.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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dialogue theories as well as departmentalist theories agree that the debate 
involves negotiating these two competing duties.73  There is also a third 
“political” element.  The decision to enforce but not defend DOMA smacks 
of political compromise: President Obama and Attorney General Holder 
appear to have done the work of “cool politicians who thread political nee-
dles.”74 
President Obama’s reluctance to take a clear, public stand on same-sex 
marriage, while having the DOJ argue against its constitutionality (yet ulti-
mately defer to the judiciary), recalls what Graber and others have dis-
cussed, in reference to Congress, as “legislative deferrals”75 or symbolic 
“position-taking.”76  That is, the Obama Administration seems to want to 
appease its base while ultimately passing its hard and unpopular decisions 
to the judiciary, thus avoiding political backlash and electoral accountabil-
ity.77  That the DOJ filed its first brief against DOMA’s constitutionality at 
a low point in the news cycle—the Friday before a Fourth of July week-
end—is consistent with this interpretation.78  The strongly worded brief, re-
counting a long history of discrimination, including the role of the federal 
government, was celebrated in Lesbian Gay Bisexual & Transgender 
(“LGBT”) presses such as Metro Weekly but appears to have received little 
to no coverage in mainstream media.79  The whole situation seems a little 
sneaky and unprincipled, fitting Kerr’s description of a “power grab dis-
guised as academic constitutional interpretation.”80  In order to locate a 
principled, constitutional decision, it seems one must engage in a significant 
amount of maneuvering and post hoc justification. 
In the fifth section, however, I argue that this “political” element of 
President Obama’s decision to enforce but not defend is neither unconstitu-
tional nor unprincipled.  I suggest we read the Constitution as creating an 
executive duty to represent, a democratic duty that should be balanced 
against the duty to defend and enforce statutes, and the duty to interpret and 
                                                          
 73.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 74.  Prakash, supra note 6, at 561. 
 75.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 76.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 78.  See Chris Geidner, DOJ: Court Should Not Dismiss Karen Golinski’s Health Benefits 
Claim, Should Instead Find DOMA Unconstitutional, METRO WEEKLY (Jul. 1, 2011, 10:55 PM) 
http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/07/doj-court-should-not-dismiss-k.html (noting that the 
DOJ filed its brief for Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012), on 
July 1, 2011); see also supra note 50.   
 79.  See, e.g., Geidner, supra note 78 (reporting one sentence summaries of Attorney General 
Holder’s letter announcing the decision to enforce but not defend DOMA). 
 80.  Kerr, supra note 51. 
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uphold a constitutional vision.  I also argue that introducing this “duty to 
represent” does not open the door to great executive discretion, increase of 
power, or unprincipled evaluations of executive power.  Democratic repre-
sentation contains its own constraints and its own principled standards for 
evaluation. 
III.  A DUTY OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 
The Constitution creates the Office of the President as one that is, in 
part, an office of representation.  From this office, certain constitutional du-
ties follow.  The Constitution authorizes the President, as head of the execu-
tive branch, to represent the United States in a number of areas.  The Presi-
dent represents the United States in dealing with foreign powers.81  The 
President also represents the United States internally, via the Take Care 
Clause, as executor of the laws.82  Perhaps the most obvious instance of this 
latter form of representation occurs in the courts, when the executive 
branch, via the DOJ, legally represents the United States.83 
The Constitution also defines the presidency as an elected office and 
makes this office the only one elected by the nation.84  Thus, we also under-
stand the presidency as an office of democratic representation, and a unique 
one, insofar that it is the only office of democratic representation tied to a 
national constituency.  What these duties are precisely is not clearly speci-
fied in the Constitution.  Some duties can be derived from the few details 
provided in Article II’s construction of the office—a four year term, now 
limited to two terms; indirect election by state legislatures, now the Elec-
toral College; and that the President’s successor in emergency or removal, 
the Vice President, is elected by the same procedure.85  All this points to a 
national constituency of states and citizens.  That said, given the degree of 
indirectness in elections and that the second term begins but does not end 
with an election, there is interpretive room for a broader notion of a constit-
uency—one that may not be precisely tied to those who directly or indirect-
ly vote for the President.  In general, the few details provided do not imme-
diately suggest much about the sort of representative duties the office 
entails. 
                                                          
 81.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 82.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
 83.  See Pub. L. No. 89-554 §  4(c), 80 Stat. 613 (1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006)) 
(“Except as otherwise provided by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an 
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefore, is reserved 
to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”). 
 84.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 1. 
 85.  Id. 
 300 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:287 
Finding such a duty to represent may seem to leave open the door to 
great executive discretion and the undisciplined exercise of power as long 
as a degree of popular and partisan support exists.  Consequently, it may be 
hard to see how executive behavior could be disciplined by a constitution or 
even the rule of law.  One might reasonably fear that deriving a constitu-
tional duty to represent would lead to pure majoritarianism (or partisan-
ship), with an emphasis on presentist political concerns. 
These concerns, however, are rooted in a problematic concept of dem-
ocratic representation and are alleviated by a different approach to the con-
cept.  The concept of democratic representation that generates these con-
cerns is based on the incorrect idea that democratic representation requires 
representatives’ “continuing responsiveness” to voter preferences.86  The 
normative model underlying responsiveness goes something like this: In a 
representative democracy, the people are represented in the legislative pro-
cess.  Through elections, the people communicate their will to their repre-
sentatives.  Good democratic representation is defined as representatives 
acting in accordance with the interests of the people.  Representatives are 
then evaluated according to the degree they do or do not act in the people’s 
interests. 
The representative relationship is unidirectional with both power and 
the directives for exercising that power flowing from the people to their po-
litical representatives.87  This relationship has also been conceived of as a 
“principal-agent” relationship, with people understood as the principal, and 
representatives as their agents.88 
This idea that democratic representation involves and requires continu-
ing responsiveness to constituent preferences has been increasingly chal-
lenged in the political science literature.89  Models of democratic represen-
tation have taken a “constructivist” turn.90  Democratic representation is 
rarely conceived as a dyadic, unmediated, unidirectional relationship be-
tween a representative and her constituents.  Instead, democratic representa-
                                                          
 86.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971) (arguing 
“a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the 
preferences of its citizens”); Lisa Disch, Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Repre-
sentation, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 100, 100 (2011) (refuting “the idea that representative democ-
racy is defined by the ‘continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citi-
zens’” with evidence that “[e]mpircal findings . . . reveal, instead, that the representative process 
is dynamic and interactive”) (internal citations omitted). 
 87.  Disch, supra note 86, at 100. 
 88.  Id. at 106. 
 89.  See id. at 100 (“Empirical findings . . . reveal, instead, that the representative process is 
dynamic and interactive.”). 
 90.  Id. at 102–03. 
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tion is increasingly understood as a mediated, systemic process—involving 
institutions like the media and relationships between governing institu-
tions—as well as a multi-directional one.91  Voter preferences are no longer 
seen as the “bedrock” of democratic representation that the responsiveness 
paradigm assumes.92  Empirical political scientists model dynamic models 
of representation that assume preferences are endogenous to the process of 
representation,93 and many have replaced voter interests with the more 
complex, multidimensional concept of attitudes.94 
The notion of “continuing responsiveness” no longer makes sense as 
the only—or even central—way to understand what democratic representa-
tives actually do or what they should do.  Work conducted through this 
new, “constructivist” paradigm of democratic representation shows how the 
concept of representation contains its own constraints, both empirical and 
normative.  Below, I show how these new models of democratic representa-
tion can be used to give specific content to the constitutional duty to repre-
sent and alleviate fears of expansive executive power, majoritarianism, and 
presentism. 
IV.  THE CONTOURS OF A DUTY OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 
Quite helpfully, the political theorist Jane Mansbridge has parsed out 
the central models of democratic representation found in the empirical liter-
ature, models she labels “promissory,” “anticipatory,” “gyroscopic,” and 
“surrogate” representation.95  These models are not exclusive but comple-
mentary.  Each model describes the institutional and political constraints 
experienced by democratic representatives and outlines the standards that 
should be used to evaluate both a representative’s behavior and institutional 
design. 
                                                          
 91.  See id. at 105 (explaining that “systemic” forms of representation are more “interactive 
and more continually reflexive” than the promissory model). 
 92.  Id. at 100. 
 93.  See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber & John Jackson, Endogenous Preferences and the Study of 
Institutions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 639, 639 (1993) (describing how “voter preferences” are “en-
dogenous in the model of electoral competition” because they “shift in direct response to the ac-
tions of the parties as they search for strategies to increase their likelihood of winning elections”); 
James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. 
POL. SCI. REv. 543, 552 (1995) (analyzing the effects of public opinion and executive policy using 
a model of “endogenous effects”). 
 94.  See, e.g., Larry Bartels, Democracy with Attitudes, in ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY 48, 49 
(Michael B. Mackuen & George Rabinowitz eds., 2003) (arguing “that citizens should be thought 
of as having attitudes rather than preferences” because “those beliefs are not sufficiently complete 
and coherent to serve as a satisfactory starting point for democratic theory”). 
 95.  Mansbridge, supra note 20, at 515. 
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“Promissory representation” emphasizes the promises candidates make 
in running for office.96  The normative concept underlying this model is that 
the representative represents the electoral will at the time of her election.97  
The model involves a “forward-looking concept of power,” where the elect-
ed official becomes the electorate’s agent and is disciplined by the threat of 
sanction at re-election.98  Evaluation involves examining the representa-
tive’s promise-keeping behavior, as well as the conditions that enable voters 
to evaluate promise-keeping, such as the conditions under which the elec-
tion is held and the transparency of representative behavior.99 
“Anticipatory representation” is based on the idea of retrospective vot-
ing.100  In retrospective voting, the voter evaluates the representative’s be-
havior over the past term.101  The representative thus represents the electoral 
will not at the time of the initial, or authorizing election (as in the promisso-
ry model), but at the time of re-election.  In making decisions, the repre-
sentative should—in both prudential and moral terms—anticipate the elec-
torate’s will in the next election.102  This model need not only apply to 
representatives running for re-election.  For example, a representative might 
anticipate voters’ evaluation of his party, while a President might look to 
his legacy, and the so-called “judgment of history.” 
The anticipatory representation adds complications absent in the 
straightforward model of promissory representation.  For one, good antici-
patory representation can involve acting in contradiction to the stated pref-
erences of the majority.  The anticipatory model does not look to past or 
immediate congruence between voter preferences and a representative’s ac-
tion.103  And unlike the promissory model, the expressed preferences of the 
electorate at the authorizing election are not the only standard used to eval-
uate representative behavior.  This is because the electorate may change its 
mind between elections, and these changes may be facilitated by the repre-
sentative.  Anticipatory representation thereby introduces an element of en-
dogeneity and encourages representatives to become potential policy entre-
preneurs or, to use a more normatively colored descriptor, leaders.104  
                                                          
 96.  Id. at 516. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 516–20. 
 101.  Id. at 516. 
 102.  Id. at 516–17.  
 103.  See id. at 518 (noting that this anticipatory model “undermines the traditional understand-
ing of accountability”). 
 104.  Id. at 520. 
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Anticipatory representation calls attention to the conditions under which the 
electorate’s preferences are formed.105  In anticipatory representation, eval-
uation involves examining the communicative and deliberative qualities of 
the institutional system as a whole.106 
In “gyroscopic” representation, “representatives act like gyroscopes, 
rotating on their own axes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain 
built-in (although not fully immutable) goals.”107  This model does not de-
pend on sanctions or electoral incentives.  Instead, voters select representa-
tives based on their goal(s), value(s), interpretative schema(s), or common 
sense.108  Evaluation thus depends on transparency, openness, and the quali-
ty of deliberation at the time of initial election or authorization, as well as 
representative behavior that is consistent and predictable.109  Representative 
accountability, suggests Mansbridge, is not to the voters, but to one’s self or 
political party.110  Similar to anticipatory representation, there is emphasis 
on the institutional system as a whole—institutions should be designed such 
that representative “gyroscopes” can properly engage and deliberate.111 
In “surrogate representation,” the representative represents individuals 
or groups with whom he has no electoral connection.112  To illustrate, con-
sider Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank, who explicitly saw him-
self as representing LGBT people, including those outside his district.113  
Surrogate representation is evaluated according to the perspectives repre-
sented in the legislative process, with the aim of inclusion along with crite-
ria such as diversity, all-affected principles, or expertise and wisdom.114 
Taken together, these models help us specify the contours of an execu-
tive duty of political representation.  Democratic representation requires 
that the Executive keep promises made at election (the promissory mod-
el).115  It also requires that the Executive look forward in time and antici-
pate the judgment of a future electorate or the judgment of history (the an-
ticipatory model).116  Democratic representation further requires that the 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 518. 
 106.  Id. at 519–20. 
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 109.  Id. at 521. 
 110.  Id. at 522. 
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 113.  Id. at 523. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 516. 
 116.  Id. at 520. 
 304 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:287 
Executive present a clear and accurate view to the electorate of his or her 
own values and interests, those principles and beliefs that will guide the Ex-
ecutive during his or her time in office (the gyroscopic model).117  And if 
the Executive represents a certain group or groups to which he or she has no 
electoral connection, then democratic representation requires that the Exec-
utive represent that perspective (the surrogate model).118 
Besides providing standards for evaluating the behavior of executives, 
these models also point to the features that should be included in institu-
tional design.  Democratic representation requires transparency at the time 
of elections, and transparency in behavior while holding office (the promis-
sory, anticipatory, and surrogate models).119  Democratic representation 
demands that we look to the conditions under which preferences are 
formed, and encourage good deliberative practices between the voting pub-
lic and their representatives (all models).120  Democratic representation also 
requires institutions that foster engagement and deliberation between gov-
erning officials (the gyroscopic model).121 
At this point, the astute reader will have noticed that it is not always 
clear what the duty of democratic representation demands.  In fact, the de-
mands of a duty of democratic representation may sometimes—perhaps of-
ten—conflict.  For example, a representative might learn new information 
while in office, and her values might lead her to change her beliefs regard-
ing a policy and then break a promise she made during her electoral cam-
paign.  In this case, she would be fulfilling her duty under the gyroscopic 
model but not under the promissory model.  Alternatively, a representative 
might change his personal beliefs about a policy, but follow the platform he 
articulated in his campaign.  He would then be following the promissory 
model of representation but not the gyroscopic model.  In a classic case of 
conflict created by this duty, a representative might sacrifice transparency 
for reasons of national security.122  To put this in terms of the demands of 
representation, the representative might sacrifice the conditions needed for 
representation (the promissory, anticipatory, and surrogate models), for the 
campaign promises regarding security (the promissory model), for future 
                                                          
 117.  Id. at 521. 
 118.  Id. at 522. 
 119.  See supra text accompanying notes 96–106, 112–114. 
 120.  See supra text accompanying notes 96–114. 
 121.  See supra text accompanying notes 107–111. 
 122.  See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 23, at 131 (acknowledging that despite “[t]he public release 
of OLC legal opinions, . . . strong reasons for not releasing some material . . . [include] national 
security concerns.”).  
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evaluations of his action (the anticipatory model), and for his understanding 
of national interest (the gyroscopic model). 
The fact that the demands of democratic representation may often con-
flict should not give us too much pause. Constitutional duties often conflict.  
The Constitution requires the balancing of different obligations, and it is not 
always clear what the Constitution requires.  But the Constitution contains 
within it mechanisms for resolving these dilemmas.  We have theories of 
interbranch dialogue and conflict, and of judicial resolution.123  We also 
have electoral constraints, and the judgment of the people—immediately, in 
the next election, and over the course of history.124  What is most essential 
is that the duty of democratic representation—like any constitutional duty—
offers standards that can be applied to give specificity to judgments and 
constrain the behavior of elected officials, whether those constraints be a 
function of institutional design (such as mechanisms for transparency), the 
power of another branch (such as a decision by the Supreme Court), the 
prospects of re-election, or the weight of the judgment of history. Recogniz-
ing this duty of democratic representation offers further standards and con-
straints, as illustrated by debates around the Obama Administration’s deci-
sion to enforce DOMA but not defend it. 
V.  REVISITING THE DECISION TO ENFORCE BUT NOT DEFEND 
Applying a duty of democratic representation alters the debates over 
the Obama Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend DOMA.  In 
light of this duty of democratic representation, the Obama Administration 
engaged in a constitutionally adequate balancing of conflicting constitu-
tional duties including conflicting duties of representation.  This is not to 
say that this analysis here should conclude the debate.  Others might rea-
sonably disagree with the conclusion that the Administration engaged in 
merely adequate balancing.  Regardless, applying a duty of democratic rep-
resentation gives greater specificity and rigor to the question of whether that 
decision was constitutionally justified and points to additional dimensions 
of constitutionality that had previously been ignored through the bracketing 
of “political” questions.  A duty of democratic representation also gives ad-
ditional weight to standing concerns.  Not only is the DOJ’s standing an is-
                                                          
 123.  See id. at 111 (discussing several different theories of interbranch authority, including: 
“‘presidential’ or ‘coordinate’ review, ‘constitutional protestantism,’ ‘policecentric constitutional-
ism,’ ‘constitutional construction,’ ‘constitutional dialogue,’ and ‘populist constitutionalism.’”). 
 124.  See Mansbridge, supra note 20, at 516 (emphasizing, for example, promissory represen-
tation’s “focus[] on the . . . promises made in the authorizing election”). 
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sue from a Take Care Clause perspective,125 it is also a concern when eval-
uating the Administration’s decision from the perspective of a duty of dem-
ocratic representation.126  In addition, applying a duty of democratic repre-
sentation draws attention away from executive behavior towards systemic 
concerns regarding the quality of democracy.127 
First, consider the demands of the promissory model. Overall, the de-
cision to enforce but not defend DOMA meets the obligations of the prom-
issory model.  President Obama’s position in his 2008 campaign was that 
marriage should be between opposite-sex couples, although he also sup-
ported civil unions, while opposing a federal ban on same-sex marriage as 
well as California’s Proposition 8.128  Attorney General Holder’s letter to 
Congress did not explicitly contradict that campaign statement,129 and the 
position in regard to DOMA could be interpreted, as President Obama stat-
ed, as consistent with the argument that the issue should be decided at the 
state level.130  As Professor Prakash pointed out, however, an equal protec-
tion ruling at the federal level would likely have implications for state law, 
eventually leading to the invalidation of state prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage.131  That said, the implications for state-level law would likely be far 
down the road, with many opportunities for the democratic and judicial 
processes to intervene.132  The decision to enforce but not defend does not 
exactly break a campaign promise.  Of equal importance, the non-defense 
aspect of the Administration’s decision kept President Obama’s campaign 
promise to work for LGBT rights.133 
                                                          
 125.  See Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Feb. 24, 
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Rather than a failure to meet the duty of democratic representation, the 
Administration’s decision to enforce but not defend draws attention to what 
was a tension in his platform: LGBT rights and no same-sex marriage.134  
Yet those campaign promises were transparent, so the failure does not seem 
to be one of executive representation.  If there is any failure here, it is more 
a failure of democracy to neither recognize the tension in his campaign plat-
form nor anticipate a complex parsing of the issue while he was in office. 
It is with regard to gyroscopic representation that the Obama Admin-
istration may be most culpable.  By attempting to appeal to and appease ad-
vocates of LGBT rights and same-sex marriage, while also wanting to stay 
in line with mainstream public opinion (which has opposed same-sex mar-
riage),135 President Obama may have failed on the transparency and pre-
dictability dimensions.  But, again, if this is a failure, it is failure that should 
be understood as a democratic one as much as a representative one—the 
electorate should have realized that a tension existed within President 
Obama’s own position. 
According to the standards of the surrogate model, we might under-
stand the Obama Administration to represent a viewpoint that had less elec-
toral representation due to its minority status.  This argument is consistent 
with those who have defended the Administration’s action because the issue 
at hand was an equal protection one, requiring special protection of histori-
cally disempowered minorities.136 
In the case of the decision to enforce but not defend, it is the anticipa-
tory model that adds the most to existing constitutional debates.  In taking a 
position that anticipated movement in public opinion while also deferring to 
the Supreme Court and delaying explicit position-taking, the Obama Ad-
ministration is responding to the electorate’s will in the next election.  At 
least in the short term, the position of the national electorate has clearly and 
                                                          
294/support-repeal-of-the-defense-of-marriage-act/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (rating Obama’s 
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 134.  See Tom Curry, The ‘Evolution’ of Obama’s Stance on Gay Marriage, 
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significantly moved toward approval of same-sex marriage.137  There is no 
obvious reason to think this trend will be reversed anytime soon. 
The anticipatory model also draws attention to the conditions of demo-
cratic deliberation.  According to this systemic dimension of anticipatory 
representation, the Obama Administration’s decision is not as easily de-
fended.  The Administration’s non-defense has prompted jurisdictional 
questions at the risk of impeding interbranch constitutional dialogue.138  
The DOJ, representing the United States, agreed with the constitutional 
finding of the lower court ruling in Windsor, as well as the party that was 
supposedly its adversary (Windsor).139  It is not clear, then, that an actual 
case or controversy existed. 
This is no small concern, and has the potential to hamper, instead of 
foster, interbranch dialogue.  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court 
clearly took the jurisdictional question seriously, asking both BLAG and the 
DOJ to address the issue, as well as appointing Jackson as a “friend of the 
court.”140  The precedents for DOJ standing are debatable.  In both United 
States v. Lovett141 and INS v. Chadha,142 individuals were injured by the ex-
ecutive enforcement of a statute and brought suit.143  In Lovett, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the statute, but at the time of his signature, 
noted his constitutional objections and explained he was signing the bill for 
national security reasons.144  In its opinion, the Court noted the President’s 
objection, as well as the piece of legislation—an appropriations bill—and 
the timing—World War II.145  The Congressional statute at issue in Lovett 
involved employees of the executive branch, and Congress voted, in a Joint 
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Resolution, to authorize counsel to defend the statute.146  All these features 
were lacking in Windsor. 
In Chadha, the Court did not address the question of whether the Im-
migration and Nationalization Service—who agreed with the plaintiff, 
Chadha—had Article III standing.147  In Windsor, however, the lower court 
sided with the injured individual, and the DOJ agreed with the lower court 
decision, yet still asked for Supreme Court review.148  The DOJ claims that 
a controversy existed because it would lose money to Windsor (who, the 
lower court has said, will not have to pay an inheritance tax on her deceased 
spouse’s property).149  It is not at all clear that an actual controversy existed 
in Windsor or that Lovett and Chadha are indeed precedents for appealing a 
decision while not defending it. 
Regardless of what the Supreme Court actually decided in Windsor, it 
is clear that the answer to this question was not, and is not, obvious: the 
Administration took a risk in pursuing this path of enforcement absent de-
fense.  This risk entailed not only a Take Care concern, but also a concern 
with a duty of democratic representation, because a failure to appeal the 
case may impede interbranch dialogue.  If the Administration had both de-
fended and enforced DOMA, these concerns about standing would not ex-
ist.  In addition, a critic applying the duty of democratic representation 
might also argue that in avoiding an explicit statement on same-sex mar-
riage as a policy issue, President Obama has impeded rather than encour-
aged open communication and deliberation. 
By taking a deferential position toward the judiciary and avoiding a 
more direct constitutional confrontation with the courts,150 however, it is 
possible that the Administration has created conditions more conducive to 
dialogue and persuasion.  As Bryan Garsten has written, persuasion begins 
with acknowledgement of shared values and concerns.151  Part of the value 
of recognizing other models of representation beyond the traditional “re-
sponsiveness” concept of representation is that notions of accountability 
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shift: the Administration may be less explicit with regard to its own position 
at one moment in time, but the anticipatory model does not demand person-
al accountability so much as systemic accountability. 
Some of the systemic concerns that the anticipatory model draws at-
tention to are harder to address.  The ability for accountability to occur now 
and in the future rests not only on transparency at the time of election—
which exists—and transparency in executive behavior—which has existed, 
although not without some room for improvement—but also upon the con-
ditions of deliberation.  In other words, to constrain executive power in a 
representative democracy, the practices of democracy must flourish.  Citi-
zens must evaluate their governing officials, and they must give their judg-
ments force through voting and other forms of political action.152  The abil-
ity of citizens to judge and give force to their judgments depends not only 
on their individual willingness and capacity, but also upon the conditions of 
deliberation themselves—the so-called information environment, the char-
acter of communication between representatives and constituents, as well as 
the character of mass communication, including the health of social institu-
tions like the media.  As many have pointed out, it is unclear whether the 
contemporary conditions of mass communication—including the effects of 
campaign finance laws—are able to foster the sort of deliberation needed to 
sustain a healthy representative democracy.153 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Applying a duty of democratic representation generates some conclu-
sions that dovetail with existent debates over the Obama Administration’s 
decision to enforce but not defend DOMA.  Concerns about transparency, 
predictability, and personal accountability are all prominent in the existent 
debates.  Far from opening the door to justifying broad executive discretion, 
introducing a duty to represent gives more content and specificity to exist-
ent normative concerns.  In addition, the anticipatory model also enables a 
principled evaluation of Administration action that others have dismissed as 
“political” or accountability-avoidant, by both altering the moment of ac-
countability (from the present to the future) as well as the communicative 
relationship (from communication between the representative and the con-
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stituency to systemic communication).  In the case of the Obama Admin-
istration’s duty to enforce but not defend, applying a duty of democratic 
representation adds additional concerns to certain dimensions of the de-
bate—such as standing and interbranch dialogue—while also suggesting 
that fears of expansive executive power should be refocused on systemic 
democratic failures. 
Although this Essay’s analysis has suggested the Obama Administra-
tion engaged in a reasonable balancing of conflicting constitutional duties, I 
do not intend to say that recognizing and applying a duty of democratic rep-
resentation definitively resolves the question of whether the Administra-
tion’s decision was the correct one.  Perhaps the most significant implica-
tion of recognizing and specifying this duty of democratic representation is 
that it reminds us that the Constitution does not resolve—nor does it aim to 
resolve—all questions. This aspect is essential to the Constitution’s demo-
cratic character.  The Constitution constructed a liberal democracy, where 
the law is intended to provide consistent restraints on the behavior of gov-
erning officials, but the law does not determine officials’ actions.  The peo-
ple of a democracy are required to play a central role in constraining offi-
cials.  Some actions of the Executive, like the actions of any democratic 
representative, may only have their moment of accountability in the future.  
This reliance on popular accountability is inherent in the concept of demo-
cratic representation, and whether that constraint is a meaningful one will 
depend in no small part upon the health of all democratic institutions, not 
just institutions of governance. 
